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Marc Milner 
As the son of a Normandy campaign veteran I have lived with - and relived - the campaign 
for as long as I can remember. When I began to 
teach military history the Normandy campaign 
found a p r o m i n e n t p lace in my c l a s s room 
analysis of WW II battle practice. By then I had 
also largely b o u g h t into the two d o m i n a n t 
paradigms of the Normandy fighting. The first 
was that while the Americans ground their way 
doggedly (if ineptly) th rough the bocage, the 
excellent tank country around Caen was wasted 
by the Anglo-Canadians. The second paradigm 
followed naturally from the first. The Allies fought 
poorly in Normandy while the Germans fought 
superbly. We had won through what J o h n Ellis 
calls "brute force."1 
My comfortable notions about the Normandy 
campaign were profoundly altered by a tour of 
the Anglo-Canadian battlefields in 1991, and by 
a second one this pas t spring which ventured 
into the Amer ican zone. The experience so 
shattered my assumptions that it is hard to know 
where to start. But perhaps it is best to begin 
with the ground. 
Gordon A. Harrison, author of the US Army's 
official history, Cross-Channel Attack, broke the 
Norman topography into five areas: 
the north Cotentin (rolling uplands north of 
Valognes), the south Cotentin (generally flat and 
well watered), the Bessin (the coastal strip lying 
between Isigny and Bayeux), the Bocage (hilly 
wooded country extending south of the Bessin 
and Cotentin nearly to the base of the Brittany 
Peninsula) and the relatively open Caen country 
from Bayeux east and southeast.2 
The Bessin west of Bayeux and the southern 
Coten t in were seized quickly following the 
landings , a n d the n o r t h e r n Cotent in w a s a 
strategic dead end. The Bocage and the open 
ground around Caen lay between the Allies and 
a b r e a k - o u t of t h e b e a c h h e a d , t h u s t hey 
command attention in the Normandy literature 
and are the focus of this paper. 
Illustrations (see next page) serve better than 
words to describe the bocage (which seems to be 
used synonymously with "hedgerow country"). 
A Canadian, familiar with the great open area 
a round Caen, is s t ruck by the na tu r e of the 
ground south and southeast of Bayeux in what 
became the British sector. The ground around 
Villers-Bocage and Caumont is steeply rolling, 
with open fields guarded by hedgerows and deep, 
wooded valleys. The American bocage further 
w e s t o f B a y e u x i s even m o r e b r o k e n by 
hedgerows. 
The g r o u n d s o u t h a n d wes t o f Bayeux 
profoundly shaped the character and tempo of 
the battle. The British bocage is noteworthy for 
two major offensives. The first was a thrus t south 
of Bayeux that commenced on 11 J u n e . It came 
to a halt two days later when leading elements of 
the 7th Armoured Division were s topped by 
Michael Wittman's Tiger tank outside Villers-
Bocage: the spearhead of Panzer Lehr Division. 
The British reacted by flattening Villers-Bocage 
from the air and cancelling the advance.3 The 
second, Operation "Bluecoat" - the so-called 
British breakout on 30 Ju ly - was l aunched 
against an enfeebled enemy. Nonetheless, the 
British found their own bocage tough going: 
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An aerial photo showing the 
typical bocage that covers much 
of Normandy. The ancient 
patchwork of individual fields 
formed by the hedgerows which 
bound them proved a serious 
tactical problem for both the 
American and British armies. 
The height of the hedgerows is 
indicated by the length of the 
shadows, in many cases, taller 
than the buildings at the lower 
left. 
WLU Air Photo 305/4042 
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enough that the crisis in British infantry 
casualties was attributed to it.4 It is interesting 
to note, however, that they launched only two 
major operations in the bocage in nearly two 
months of continuous fighting (to be fair, the 
opening stages of "Epsom" passed through 
bocage as well): a point I shall return to. The 
"real" bocage fighting, of course, fell to the US 
Army slogging its way south along either side of 
the Vire River. But here, too, there were very few 
(two?) major operations. I had always thought it 
odd that there were so few distinguishable 
"battles" in the American Normandy campaign. 
In contrast, action in the open ground 
around Caen was characterized by quite distinct 
operational level battles: "Epsom," "Charnwood," 
"Goodwood," "Spring," "Totalize," "Tractable" and 
others. Indeed, the difference in the structure of 
the campaign on the two fronts lends credence 
to the criticism that Montgomery preferred set-
piece battles, which were a sign of his caution 
and the ineffectiveness of British fighting in 
general. Meanwhile, the dogged Americans, 
buoyed by greater personnel reserves and driven 
by a more aggressive doctrine, moved steadily 
against the Germans through the hedgerows. 
It is a comfortable image, and one popularly 
accepted. But the ground had a profound 
impact on the shape of the campaign, and some 
historians have noted that. So long as the 
Germans retained any reserves of manpower and 
the ability to move men and equipment, and so 
long as the Allies were stuck to the roads, fighting 
in the bocage was simply a grinding, murderous 
battle of attrition. In the case of the US Army, it 
was possible to grind forward through the bocage 
in battalion or regimental level operations, and 
it did so - as its casualty statistics reveal (US 
casualties by the end of the Normandy campaign 
were significantly higher than those of the Anglo-
Canadians). 
The ability to infiltrate the hedgerow country 
had, in fact, been seen as one of the benefits of 
fighting in the bocage in the first place. In such 
terrain it would be hard for the enemy to prevent 
gradual infiltration, and once the Allies were in, 
extremely hard for the Germans to knock them 
out with a single, strategic counterattack.5 So, 
before 6 June 1944 the bocage looked good - or 
at least planners were able to put a positive spin 
on it. 
The idea that broken, heavily wooded ground 
was suitable for infiltration was not limited to 
Normandy or to the Allies. The ground in front 
of the main German Gothic Line position in 
northern Italy, between the Metauro and Foglia 
Rivers, is rugged, hilly c o u n t r y - p e r h a p s 
quintessentially I ta l ian-wi th deep, heavily 
wooded ravines cutting into sharp hillsides, 
narrow winding roads, picturesque villages, 
and razor-backed ridges. Looking at the ground 
from the village of Montemaggiore (south of the 
Metauro) in 1985 I hazarded a guess that a 
determined enemy could delay an attacker for 
weeks over such ground. Dominick Graham, a 
veteran himself, a distinguished gunner and 
military historian, and leader of the tour merely 
frowned. Gazing at me over the rims of his 
glasses he said wearily, "Yes, and you could 
slip the whole bloody Chinese army through! 
No good fields of fire, Marc!-Too hard to 
defend. Wait till you see the main position." 
When we reached the southern edge of the 
Foglia valley I understood precisely what he 
meant. The main German position was laid out 
north of the river, on wide, totally open, rolling 
ground, sloping towards the river like the glacis 
of some great fortress. The broad open valley 
in front of that fortress was a killing ground, 
and there was virtually no cover up the grassy 
slopes beyond. Infiltration was not possible. Here 
was ground that could be defended with fire. 
If open ground can be defended by fire, then 
the bocage had to be defended by men and it 
could only be won by men fighting at close range 
in a steady brawl. When I saw the ground it 
immediately became a p p a r e n t why the 
American advance was so undramatic. No great 
wind-up, followed by a crash of army groups of 
artillery and a mad dash by whole divisions and 
corps for some distant strategic objective. 
Rather, the US advance was characterized by a 
steady grind and then the "sudden" capture of 
places: Carentan, St. Sauveur, Barneville, 
Valognes, Cherbourg and, finally, the high 
ground west of St. Lô. 
I had read about all of this, of course, but 
rather typically for a Canadian I ascribed this 
rather featureless campaigning to the lack of 
any serious opposition to the US Army. Afterall, 
all the tanks were opposite the Anglo-Canadian 
9 
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armies around Caen, all the US faced were 
infantry, a few tanks and a few SPs. 
This was, of course, not what the Americans 
had bargained for. The bocage threw the burden 
of battle on the infantry when so much of current 
doctrine relied on support from the tanks. 
Harrison described the frustration during the 
advance of V Corps towards St. Lo in mid-June. 
"One of the prime difficulties faced by the 
Americans in this terrain was in coordinating 
tanks and infantry." German defences consisted 
of anti-tank guns heavily supported by machine 
guns, and mortars, all well concealed in the 
hedgerows. "Tanks could not go forward to 
knock out the machine guns ," Harr ison 
observed, "nor could the infantry spearhead the 
advance to take out the anti-tank guns."6 
Not surprisingly, the advance was slow. 
David Eisenhower captured the frustration of 
American troops - and the mood of subsequent 
historians - when he opined that in the bocage 
"the superior mobility of the American Sherman 
was being nullified on a battlefield carved up 
into 150-yard plots."7 In such a static battle 
and at short ranges the advantage went to the 
"slower, more heavily armed German Mark V 
and Mark VI Panther-Tiger tanks..." which 
Eisenhower claimed were appearing "in large 
numbers [?]..."8 by mid-July. It is clear that 
David Eisenhower and many Americans then 
and now felt that if they could only get clear of 
the bocage their Shermans could run free. 
The ground, of course, dictated otherwise. 
Bradley's one serious attempt at strategic 
mobility in the bocage prior to "Cobra," the 
launching of Middleton's VIII corps towards 
Coutances in early July, was expected to be "a 
slow, costly overland battle of attrition, through 
'perfect defensive terrain.'"9 And so it was. By 
the 10th Middleton was effectively stalled and 
the offensive became, in the end, a battle for a 
good start line for "Cobra." 
In the end, the US Army achieved strategic 
mobility west of St. LÔ on 25 July as a result of 
five factors: attrition of the enemy to a point 
where the front was held by a veneer with no 
reserves at the opera t iona l level; the 
concentration of German Panzer forces to the 
east around Caen; a high degree of co-operation 
achieved with supporting tactical air forces 
10 
(much more effective than contemporary British 
practice); good training provided to experienced 
troops; and the astonishing mobility given to 
the Americans in the bocage by invention of 
hedgerow cutters for tanks. 
None of this could be pulled magically from 
a hat, or even from previous experience, prior 
to 6 June 1944. It is tempting to think that the 
German army could have been beaten by some 
lightening strategic strike in the summer of 
1944, following which they all would have 
surrendered. But that was not the character of 
the German army. As in the final Allied push of 
1918, in 1944 the Germans had to be ground-
down at great cost. If fighting in the hedgerows 
was costly and frustrating for the Americans, 
it was no less so for the Germans. 
Fighting in the bocage was also, ultimately, 
successful for the Allies. As Brigadier A.L. 
Pemberton commented in the War Office history 
of British artillery, "despite the difficult 'going'" 
the British experienced in the bocage during 
the initial stages of Operation "Epsom" in June, 
"the rate of advance was faster than had been 
customary in the mountains of Italy" to which 
he compared the worst of the Norman 
countryside.10 This may not have been what 
those in France wanted to hear, but it is 
suggestive of the larger problems of the era. 
The close count rys ide of the bocage 
nonetheless made the open ground around 
Caen look ideal for a rapid advance. Good tank 
country, vast open spaces, rolling wheat fields 
ideally suited to mechanized forces. Some have 
suggested that had the two Allied armies been 
reversed in p o s i t i o n - t h e cautious Anglo-
Canadians in the west and the fire-breathing 
Americans in the plains around Caen - the 
whole campaign would have gone much better, 
and the breakout achieved much sooner. The 
ground suggests otherwise. 
The area in a radius often to 20 miles around 
Caen itself and stretching down the highway to 
Falaise and south along the Dives River is a 
rolling plain. Although it is cut by wooded river 
valleys and dotted by compact stone villages, the 
dominant feature is the broad, prairie-like fields, 
wide vistas, flat crests and distant horizons. This 
was the ground chosen by the Overlord planners 
for airfields, and the ground over which 
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Two views of "good tank country. " 
Above: A crossroads on the Caen-
Falaise highway. The open, rolling 
nature of the plain is evident. Allied 
vehicles cover the landscape as far as 
the eye can see - an 88 gunner's 
delight. 
Right: An oblique aerial photo showing 
the same area from a different angle. 
The Caen-Falaise highway is visible at 
the right along with the quarry at 
Hautmesnil. The forested area at the 
top is Quesnay Wood. 
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Montgomery is alleged to have wanted to "crack 
about in tanks." It is, in no small measure, the 
ground the Americans eyed with envy. 
But instead of "cracking about" in tanks, 
the Anglo-Canadians stalled around Caen, and 
Monty - true to form - resorted to a series of set-
piece battles at the operational level: using 
massive firepower in lieu of tactical sophistry. 
The result was a different kind of battle of 
attrition, no strategic breakout, and enduring 
criticism of Montgomery. Montgomery later 
claimed that his offensives in the Caen area 
were never intended to break out. Rather their 
purpose was to draw the weight of German 
armour onto that front in order to free the 
Americans for their break-out. The ground 
suggests that both of these assumptions are 
far too simplistic. So what happened? 
The open terrain in the eastern beachhead 
is a natural glacis easily defended by fire. Here 
the Germans not only had the advantage of 
ground, they also had two others. First, they 
were usually defending. Second, they had a vast 
number of powerful, high velocity, long-range 
tank and anti-tank guns. All of these, like the 
vaunted 88 mm of the Tigers and the towed 
variants, the long-barrelled 75 mm of the Mark 
IV and Panthers, and even the small 75 mm 
towed Pak 40, had muzzle velocities in excess 
of 3,000 feet per second.11 All of these could 
pierce the front armour of a Sherman at more 
than 1,000 yards, and in the case of the larger 
guns -like the 88's - could take out most Allied 
tanks at twice that range.12 
Powerful guns allowed the open fields around 
Caen to be defended by fire against armour: a 
situation which cut both ways. For example, 
every German armoured assault failed. The first, 
on D-Day when some 40 tanks of the 21st Panzer 
Division attacked the western flank of 3rd British 
Division near the beaches, was seen-off smartly 
with heavy losses by both tanks and anti-tank 
guns.13 That assault, and one the next day on 
the leading elements of the 3rd Canadian 
Division near Authie, were delivered by Mark IVs, 
tanks roughly equivalent to the Sherman 
although with perhaps a better gun. In the case 
of the attack on the Canadians near Authie, two 
companies of Mark IVs of the 12th SS (Hitler 
Youth) Panzer Division were engaged by the 
Shermans of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment 
12 
on open ground in a swirling action. The 
Sherbrookes claimed somewhere between 31 
and 41 Mark IVs destroyed at a loss of 21 of 
their own tanks.14 
So much for the Mark IVs. But the Mark Vs -
the legendary Panther - fared no better. On 9 
June, as part of a series of vicious counterattacks 
on the Canadian 7th Brigade, which got astride 
the Caen-Bayeux highway, the 12th SS Panzer 
Division committed two companies of Panthers 
in a desperate attempt to clear the road after a 
number of intense infantry assaults failed. 
The armoured assault, advancing over open 
ground on The Regina Rifles' position straddling 
the road at Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse and Norrey-
en-Bessin, failed. Canadian fire stripped German 
infantry away from their tanks, which were met 
with a hail of anti-tank fire. "We were surprised," 
Kurt Meyer, the 26th Regiment's commander, 
recalled later, "by heavy anti-tank weapons. " For 
a while the Panthers were reduced to a petulant 
shelling of Bretteville from 300 yards and when 
finally they entered the village, "The Canadians 
swarmed the advancing armour."1 5 The 
Canadians claimed 12 Panthers destroyed, the 
Germans admitted to six. 
Undaunted, Meyer sent 12 Panthers out the 
next morning to attack the advanced position of 
the Reginas, a single company dug in at Norrey-
en-Bessin just south of the rail line. Once again 
concentrated small arms and artillery fire drove 
the German infantry to ground, but the Panthers 
pressed on. As they closed on Norrey, the 
Panthers turned slightly south in order to present 
their frontal armour to the 6-pounder anti-tank 
guns at the crest of the gentle slope running up 
to Norrey. Just then nine Shermans of the Fort 
Garry Horse, including several Fireflies -
Shermans re-equipped with the British 17-
pounder gun - deployed south of Bretteville, just 
1,000 yards from the attacking Panthers. Seven 
of the Panthers were destroyed in minutes. The 
German attack collapsed. So much for the 
Panthers. 
As Hubert Meyer, Chief of Staff of the 12th 
SS Panzer Division, observed, "The anti-tank 
weapons around Bretteville were so powerful that 
outflanking movements to the north and south 
were thwarted."16 As Oliver Haller concluded in 
his superb analysis of the action, "It became 
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A 12th SS Panther knocked out by Canadian infantry in Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse. 
evident that offensive operations had become 
dangerous undertakings - a reality that would 
plague the Allies for the remainder of the 
Normandy campaign...."17 When Kurt Meyer 
reported to General Geyr von Schweppenburg, 
commander of Panzer Group West, on 9 June 
that his best tanks could not budge Canadian 
infantry from their fortified villages, von 
Schweppenburg answered, "My dear Meyer, the 
war can only now be won through political 
means."18 
So the best of the masters of mobile warfare, 
equipped with the best tank of the campaign 
and led by veterans of the eastern front failed 
in the earliest days of the Normandy campaign 
to loosen the front and achieve a decisive 
s t ra tegic resul t . Indeed, t anks failed at 
Bretteville and Norrey to achieve even a tactical 
victory. Inexperience, you say? The men who 
saw them off were the utterly inexperienced and 
rather ordinary citizen soldiers of the 3rd 
Canadian Division.19 
The Germans fared no better when they 
launched much larger armoured assaults. The 
larges t of the Normandy campaign saw 
elements of five Panzer divisions hurled against 
the western flank of "Epsom" at the end of June. 
These attacks were destroyed "by massed 
artillery fire with devastating effect, and all but 
one of their attacks were dispersed before 
reaching our forward infantry positions."20 
It has been customary to apologize for 
German failure, noting that they never had a 
chance to mass armour for a proper assault and 
were hounded from the air. But these are weak 
and perhaps spurious arguments. It cannot be 
claimed that the Allies fought poorly and at the 
same time assert that the failure of the Germans 
to organize themselves sufficiently for a major 
counterattack was an act of God, or the air force. 
Steady Allied pressure on the front counted for 
something. In any event, as Pemberton points 
out, the attack on "Epsom" was stopped by guns. 
The Panthers at Bretteville and Norrey were 
beaten by anti-tank fire. In the end, fully 63 to 
65 per cent of the German tanks destroyed in 
Normandy fell to gunfire: tactical, battlefield 
fighting.21 So if the Germans, particularly the 
Panthers, could not move effectively against Allied 
anti-tank fire, what hope did regiments of 
Shermans have against the tremendous number 
of German high velocity guns? 
The stalemate around Caen was, therefore, 
the result of open ground wholly dominated by 
superior fire. Movement simply invited instant 
death from as much as 3,000 yards away. That 
great and powerful armoured phalanx called 
Operation "Goodwood" was shaped by the 
vulnerability of Allied tanks and the superiority 
of German fire. Numbers and mass ive 
supporting fire support - delivered from land, 
sea and air - was the only way to cut through 
the German defences, which were typically 
13 
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deployed in depth, with mutually supporting 
lines of dug-in tanks and anti-tank guns. In 
the case of "Goodwood" there were 11 such 
lines, with hundreds of high velocity anti-tanks 
guns aimed at vulnerable targets. So the Anglo-
Canadians led with infantry, set objectives 
within range of supporting field artillery, rushed 
forward anti-tank guns and a FOO and waited 
for the counterattack - very much the way the 
German army was fought to a bloody shambles 
in 1917-1918. 
In no small way the fighting around Caen is 
exemplified by the ill-fated Canadian attack up 
Verrières Ridge on 25 July, Operation "Spring." 
The Canadian II Corps had won the first bit of 
high ground south of Caen in the final stages of 
"Goodwood." According to historians, what lay 
before them was the excellent tank country of 
the Caen-Falaise Plain. The ground is, in fact, 
not flat, but a series of gently rolling hills of great 
tactical significance. As a rule, the Germans held 
the far crest with anti-tanks guns and dug-in 
t anks and machine guns , with powerful 
armoured and Panzer Grenadier forces in 
immediate reserve. It was the Canadians' task 
to roll down the slope from their own position, 
across the bottom of the bowl and up the far 
14 
Canadian soldiers examine the deadly 
German "88. " A shell (visible at centre) 
fired from this gun was capable of 
destroying Allied tanks at virtually any 
range. 
side before getting killed. This was 
easier said than done. 
Plans for Operation "Spring" called 
for two br igades of Canad ian 
infantry to breech the forward 
German defences, and then two 
British armoured divisions would 
pass through and "exploit." The 
task was, however, much more than 
six battalions of infantry could 
accomplish. The Caen-Falaise Plain 
was defended by the 1st SS Panzer 
Corps, with support from elements 
of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps which 
overlooked the Canadian attack 
from across the Orne River (on 
ground the British could not hold 
during "Epsom"). Directly in front 
of the Canadians lay an awesome 
array of the firepower. Around 
Verrières village itself was 1st SS [Liebstandart 
Adolf Hitler) Panzer Division, reinforced by the 
101st SS Schwer Panzer Abteilung (Tiger I); the 
12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Division was just 
out of the action to the east. The western end 
of Verrières Ridge was held by the very ordinary 
272nd Infantry Division, but it was powerfully 
reinforced by elements of the 10th SS Panzer 
Division, the 9th SS Panzer Division and an 
armoured kampfgruppe from the 2nd Panzer 
Division, with the "Koenig Tigers" (Tiger II) of 
the 503 Schwer Panzer Abteilung in immediate 
reserve behind the front. Providing direct fire 
support from across the Orne onto Verrières 
Ridge were the 10th SS Panzer Division and 
the Tigers of the 102nd SS Schwer Panzer 
Abteilung. The 2nd Panzer, 9th SS Panzer and 
116th Panzer Divisions were in immediate 
reserve behind the front. Thus, most of the 
estimated 650 tanks and assault guns on the 
British front were within firing range or a few 
minutes driving distance of the Canadian attack 
on 25 July 1944. The number of towed anti-
t ank g u n s available to the G e r m a n s is 
unknown, to me at least. 
The Canadian attack failed. While the leading 
elements of "Cobra" were slogging their way 
8
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Sherman tanks of the Fort Garry Horse left to rust on a hillside near Tilly-la-Campagne. These tanks were 
destroyed during Operation "Spring," and this photo was taken the following year. 
through the bocage, Canadian infantry surged 
across the open, fire-swept ground south of Caen 
trying to get to the enemy before the barrage lifted 
or they were shot down. The infantry gained a 
lasting foothold only in Verrières village itself. 
There the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry dug in 
about 1,000 yards from their start line and 
moved up their own 6-pounder anti-tank guns, 
while towed 17-pounders and two squadrons of 
British tanks were deployed in depth behind -
all firing over open g round . Savage 
counterattacks by the 1st SS were beaten off 
by massed artillery, machine gun, anti-tank 
and tank fire. Verrières was retained, but it 
remained a thin salient on the crest of the ridge. 
To the east, along the valley of the Orne River 
where the enemy had excellent observation and 
fields of fire from across the river, the German 
counterattacks were more successful. Tanks, 
assault guns and panzer grenadiers drove as 
far north as the original Canadian start line 
on Point 67 before being driven back. 
Operation "Spring" is either ignored in 
accounts of Normandy or, if mentioned at all, 
portrayed as another example of ineffective 
"British" fighting and lack of commitment, or 
both.22 Anyone who walks the slopes of Verrières 
Ridge, counts the barrels pointed in the 
Canadian direction and assesses the natural 
strength of the German position can only wonder 
at why the attack was mounted in the first place. 
There is an on-going debate among Canadian 
historians whether "Spring" was a holding action 
or a legitimate attempt at breakout. Whatever it 
was, the fighting was brutal and bloody: the 
second bloodiest day of the war for Canada (after 
Dieppe). The feint in support of "Cobra" cost 
Canada nearly 2,000 wounded, including almost 
500 dead, about the same casualty bill as that 
suffered by the two US divisions on Omaha beach 
on D-Day. It is significant that when Field 
Marshal Kluge had to chose between which front 
to visit on 25 July 1944 he ended up on the 
slopes of Verrières Ridge. 
It is curious, in retrospect, that this rolling 
piece of open farmland - the prized avenue for a 
strategic breakout south of Caen - was given to 
the Canadian Corps to tackle. One gets a sense 
that the British wanted out. Indeed, after 
"Goodwood" the good ground south of Caen was 
left to the Canadians, the Poles and a couple of 
British divisions to handle. The main British 
effort shifted - interestingly enough - to the 
bocage country south of Bayeux! Perhaps Major-
General George Kitching's meeting with General 
Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of Second 
British Army, is revealing on this point. Kitching 
commanded the 4th Canadian Armoured 
15 
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Division, which became operational as part of 
II Canadian Corps at the end of July. The first 
thing Dempsey asked Kitching when they met 
in Normandy was "Are your tanks petrol or 
diesel?" As Kitching recalled, "When I told him 
they were petrol , he seemed 
disappointed...General Dempsey wished that 
our tanks were diesel and, as we became 
involved in battle, so did we."23 Petrol driven 
tanks caught fire easily when their engine 
compartments were pierced and tank crews 
displayed an understandable reluctance to 
expose themselves to enemy fire. Maybe the 
British felt they were better off in the bocage: 
the short ranges largely overcame the limits on 
their own guns and, besides, nothing was proof 
against the "88. "24 
The essential problem was that the enemy 
had the long range, high velocity anti-tank guns 
and we had the little tanks that burned. The 
Allies also had to attack. The Canadian solution 
to the problem south of Caen was to adopt 
massed armoured assaults - dense phalanxes 
of tanks and armoured personnel carriers - in 
poor visibility with massive fire support , 
including strategic bombing. "Totalize," launched 
on 8 August at night, Operation "Tractable" 
launched amid smoke and dust on 14 August 
were qualified successes against what was, by 
then, a much weakened enemy (although one 
still well equipped with scores of anti-tank guns). 
The Canadians eventually exploited their 
success, pushing down beyond Falaise, towards 
Trun, St. Lambert-sur-Dives, Chambois and, 
perhaps, Argentan. Why they went is, to me at 
least, most inconceivable. By then, of course, 
the Germans were on the run and we were 
trying to link-up with Patton's Third Army 
advancing from the south. In between lay the 
rump of the German Seventh Army and Panzer 
Group West, which were trying to pass through 
the same ground, while strong German forces 
attacked from the east to hold the Falaise-
Argentan Gap open. When Bradley was asked 
if he would push his armies north of Argentan 
and stand in the way of the German escape he 
rejected the idea. "Better a solid shoulder at 
Argentan than a broken neck at Falaise!" was 
his justly famous response. So what were the 
Canadians and Poles doing south of Falaise, 
wrestling with the most lethal tide of humanity 
the west has ever witnessed? 
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Many Germans were able to slip through 
the noose because the area south of Falaise, 
particularly in the Trun-Chambois area and 
beyond, i s -we l l -bocage . It strikes one as 
genuinely odd looking over the countryside from 
the Polish monument at Mount Ormel that, 
while the Americans fought desperately for two 
months to get out of the bocage, the Canadian 
"breakthrough" south of Caen led them straight 
into it! 
In fact, one look at the ground south of 
Falaise explains why the Germans fought so 
fiercely to the nor th . Martin Blumenson 
suggested many years ago that, "The Germans 
massed their forces [around Caen]. . .not 
because Montgomery drew them there but 
because they were trying to fulfil a purpose of 
their own."25 Blumenson argues, quite rightly, 
that the Germans wanted to use the good tank 
country around Caen to launch their own 
single, knock-out blow. But it is also true that 
it was easier to defend the open ground around 
Caen with fire, than to prevent a steady Allied 
infiltration of the bocage country to the south. 
It has been suggested that the Anglo-
Americans relied too heavily on artillery, limited 
their thinking to a few thousand yards and 
failed to exploit their successes. Not only would 
the Germans have done it better, the Russians, 
too, would not have penny-pinched their way 
forward.26 I used to subscribe to those views 
but now I think they merely obscure the real 
strengths and the real problems of the Anglo-
Americans in the Normandy fighting. 
Whether it was because of their expertise 
in artillery or the dreadful weakness of their 
tanks, the Allies fought a grinding battle of 
attrition in both the bocage and in the open 
around Caen. The army that was whittled away, 
often in near suicidal counterat tacks was 
German, not Allied. To argue that the western 
Allies ought to have fought like Germans or 
Russians is, in the end, pointless. There is a 
strong element of cultural determinism in the 
way all armies fight, even if they adopt 
organization and doctrine derived from other 
armies. In any event, German armoured attacks 
invariably failed. And there was no room, nor 
the reserves to adopt a Russian-style army 
Front scale operation. 
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So, would the US Army have fared bet ter in 
the open fields a round Caen? Hard to say. The 
US equivalent of the 17-pounder ant i- tank gun, 
the 3-inch gun, features so little in the literature 
it is ha rd to get a feel for its ability. If it is the 
same gun as tha t in the M-10 tank destroyer 
then the 3-inch was perhaps not up to the task 
of handling German armour in the open at long 
ranges (the success of the 3-inch in the close 
country around Mortain is another matter). The 
17-pounder in particular, with a muzzle velocity 
in excess of 3,000 ft per second in either the towed 
or the Firefly version - and firing the new AP 
round (which even the infantry battalion level 6-
pounder could fire) was a match for German 
tanks if well handled. In that sense, Max Hasting 
is adrift when he said that "the towed anti-tank 
gun was of little value to troops in attack."27 Given 
the G e r m a n doct r ine of coun te r a t t a ck , the 
Canadian response (much as it had been in 1917-
1918) was to seize ground, lay on defensive 
supporting fire, move the anti- tank guns up and 
kill Germans. It worked, bu t it wasn' t fancy and 
analysts have carped about it ever since. 
Even without the 17-pounder the US Army 
fighting around Caen would not have been driven 
into the sea. Naval gunfire support would have 
c rushed German armoured onslaughts if the 
army's artillery had not done so already. Rommel 
knew that, and after 9 J u n e 1944 so too did 
S c h w e p p e n b u r g . B u t t h o s e little US Army 
She rmans would have brewed-up jus t as easily 
around Caen as those of the Anglo-British armies 
did. And so the US Army would have resorted to 
large, set-piece battles to overcome the problem 
of open ground dominated by superior enemy 
fire. British historians would be carping about 
the cautious Americans, and whining that if only 
Monty had had the open ground around Caen 
they would have been in Paris by the end of June . 
Or maybe not: its the ground, you see! - or 
have I missed something here? 
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